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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent months, our country has become a place where the government
has been increasingly forced to subsidize big business. With the federal takeover
of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,1 the massive $700 billion bailout of the finan-
2cial giants, and most recently, a $17.4 billion executive bailout of Detroit's
3.
automobile industry, it appears that the American people are becoming more
and more responsible for the operations of corporate America. There is a gov-
ernment bailout of another sort, however, going on in the Gulf of Mexico -
only in this case the bailout is financing oil companies that are already basking
in record profits. Originally designed to spur offshore production, this super-
fluous "bailout" could cost the American people up to $53 billion in lost reve-
nue. 4 In today's troubling financial times, the American people deserve a hard
look at a potential remedy to what many have called "corporate welfare."5 This
is especially true when the $53 billion is not being allocated to a failing compa-
ny or industry, but to one of the most profitable industries in the nation today.6
In 1995, oil and gas in the deep waters of the Gulf of Mexico were a vir-
tually untapped resource.7 Oil and gas prices were low at the time, and it was
simply too expensive to explore and drill in the deepest waters. 8 In an attempt to
Press Release, U.S. Dept. of the Treasury. Statement by Sec'y Henry M. Paulson, Jr. on
Treasury and Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency Action to Protect Fin. Markets and Taxpayers (Sept. 7.
2008), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp1 129.htm.
2 See Mark Landler & Edmund L. Andrews, Bailout Bill Wins Approval: Democrats Vow
Tighter Rules, N.Y. TIMES. Oct. 4, 2008. at Al: see also Emergency Economic Stabilization Act
of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 1 (2008).
3 See David E. Sanger, David M. Herszenhorn & Bill Vlasic, Bush Aids Detroit, but Hard
Choices Wait for Obama. N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 20, 2008, at Al.
4 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, OIL AND GAS ROYALTIES: LITIGATION OVER ROYALTY
RELIEF COULD COST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT BILLIONS OF DOLLARS 4 (June 5, 2008) [hereinaf-
ter 2008 GAO REPORT].
5 See 141 CONG. REC. H11854-01, 81159 (1995) (statement of Rep. Vento) ("This policy is
an unjustified giveaway, a tax break for big corporations at the expense of the American taxpayer.
Unfortunately, House conferees completely ignored the wishes of the majority of the House and
supported the corporate welfare approved by the Senate.").
6 See, e.g., David Ellis, Exxon Shatters Profit Records: Oil Giant Makes Corporate History
by Booking $11.7 Billion in Quarterly Profit: Earns $1,300 a Second in 2007, CNN MONEY, Feb.
1, 2008, http://money.cnn.com/2008/02/01/news/companies/exxon earnings/ ("Exxon Mobil
made history on Friday by reporting the highest quarterly and annual profits ever for a U.S. com-
pany. boosted in large part by soaring crude prices. Exxon, the world's largest publicly traded oil
company, said fourth-quarter net income rose 14% to $11.66 billion, or $2.13 per share. The com-
pany earned $10.25 billion, or $1.76 per share, in the year-ago period.").
7 Emily Heersink, Royalty Robbery: How Statutory Supremacy and the Christian Doctrine
Require Oil Companies to Pay Royalties on Leases Missing the Deep Water Royalty Relief Price
Threshold Clause, 37 PUB. CONT. L.J. 303, 306 (2008).
8 141 CONG. REC. S17019-03, S17023 (1995) (statement of Sen. Murkowski) ("With modern
technology, we will be able to allow oil and gas extraction in deep-water areas in excess of this
2,000 to 3,000 feet, but the cost would be tremendous, Mr. President.").
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correct this problem and slow down the United States' growing dependence on
foreign oil, Congress passed the Deep Water Royalty Relief Act of 1995
("DWRRA" or "the Act"). 9 The Act provided that oil and gas companies would
not have to pay the federal government royalty on certain leases in the deep
waters of the Gulf of Mexico. 10 Congress believed that the royalty relief would
immediately spur production, lead to additional and elevated signing bonuses,"'
and create new, high paying jobs for American citizens. 12
However, the Act contained a controversial provision that provided
mandatory and automatic royalty relief for all leases signed within the first five
years of the DWRRA's enactment, up to a specified volume of oil or gas.' 3 To
many oil and gas companies, this provision meant that no matter how high pric-
es rose, they would receive royalty-free production up to the statutory vo-
lumes.' 4 On the other hand, the Department of the Interior, the agency charged
with the administration of federal oil and gas leasing, construed the statute more
loosely, in a way that did not limit its ability to halt royalty relief if prices rose
above a certain threshold.' 5 Because these leases are operative for as long as oil
or gas is produced from the site, many leases signed during those five years con-
16tinue to be in effect today and will continue to be for years to come.
9 Deep Water Royalty Relief Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-58, tit. 3, §§ 301-306 (codified in
part at 43 U.S.C. § 1337 (2006)).
10 Id. § 302-04.
1 141 CONG. REc. Hi1854-01 (1995) (statement of Rep. McInnis) ("The Minerals Manage-
ment Service has estimated that the revenue impacts of the new leasing under § 304 of Senate 395
[the DWRRA] for lease sales in the central and western Gulf of Mexico between 1996 and 2000,
the deep water royalty relief provisions would result in an increased bonus of $485 million,
$113.5 million in additional bonuses on tracts that would have been leased without relief, and
$350 million in bonuses from tracts that would not have been leased until after the year 2000, if at
all, without relief.").
12 141 CONG. REC. HI1854-01 (1995) (statement of Rep. Brewster) ("Since 1982, 450,000
jobs were lost in just the exploration sector of the U.S. petroleum industry. That is almost half the
number ofjobs lost in the entire domestic manufacturing sector. More than one out of every two
workers who searched for oil and natural gas, or helped recover it, lost their job. But today, Mr.
Speaker we can begin to make a difference for oil and gas workers, for those in related industries.
and for their families and communities.").
13 See Pub. L. No. 104-58, § 304 (uncodified, but present in a note to 43 U.S.C. § 1337
(2006)).
14 See infra Parts V.A-B.
15 Id.
16 The leasing of oil and gas on federal lands is governed by 30 U.S.C. § 226:
Competitive and noncompetitive leases issued under this section shall be for a
primary term of 10 years: Provided, however, That ... [e]ach such lease shall
continue so long after its primary term as oil or gas is produced in paying
quantities. Any lease issued under this section for land on which, or for which
under an approved cooperative or unit plan of development or operation, ac-
tual drilling operations were commenced prior to the end of its primary term
and are being diligently prosecuted at that time shall be extended for two
years and so long thereafter as oil or gas is produced in paying quantities.
2010]
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Further complicating the issue, the Interior Department's leases issued
in the five-year time span following the Act's enactment were inconsistent,
clouding the interpretation of the already-vague statute. 7 Leases issued in
1996, 1997, and 2000 contained price thresholds, which cut off royalty relief if
oil and gas prices rose above the threshold.18 However, the 1031 leases issued
in 1998 and 1999 did not contain price thresholds.' 9 Therefore, these leases
could produce oil and gas free of any obligation to pay royalty up to the statuto-
ry volumetric threshold, no matter how high oil and gas prices soared. The is-
suance of these leases in 1998 and 1999 has been called a "monumental blund-
er" and "one of the greatest train robberies in the history of the world. 20 Oth-
ers, however, argue that the DWRRA makes royalty relief in all leases issued
from 1996 through 2000 automatic, up to the volumetric threshold, and thus it is
not the 1998 and 1999 leases that were the problem. Rather, the leases in 1996,
1997, and 2000 that contained illegal price thresholds in conflict with the statute
are the true "blunder.,
21
Kerr-McGee, 22 a Houston-based oil company operating in the Gulf of
Mexico, recently took this issue to court.23 Ruling in favor of Kerr-McGee, the
Western District Court of Louisiana held that price thresholds in leases issued
between 1996 and 2000 are in conflict with the clear and unambiguous language
30 U.S.C. § 226(e) (2006).
17 Edmund L. Andrews, Vague Law and Hard Lobbying Add up to Billions for Big Oil, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 27, 2006, at Al [hereinafter Vague Law] ("But in what administration officials said
appeared to be a mistake, Clinton administration managers omitted the crucial escape clause [price
threshold] in all offshore leases signed in 1998 and 1999. At the time, with oil prices still below
$20 a barrel, the mistake seemed harmless. But energy prices have been above the cutoff points
since, 2002, and Interior Department official estimate that about one-sixth of production in the
Gulf of Mexico is still exempt from royalties.").
18 MARC HUMPHRIES, CRS REP. FOR CONG., ROYALTY RELIEF FOR U.S. DEEPWATER OIL AND
GAS LEASES 6 (Sept. 18, 2008), available at
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RS22567_20080918.pdf ("According to the Minerals Management
Service, although the Secretary of the Interior is not required to impose price thresholds in each
lease (but has the discretion to do so). all lease sales held since the enactment of DWRRA in-
cluded price thresholds except those held in 1998 and 1999.").
19 Oil and Gas Royalty Management at DO]. Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Energy and
Natural Resources, 110th Cong. 15 (2007) (statement of Mark Gaffigan. Acting Dir.. U.S. Gov't
Accountability Office).
20 Edmund L. Andrews, U.S. Royalty Plan to Give Windfall to Oil Companies, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 14, 2006. at Al [hereinafter Royalty Plan] (quoting U.S. Rep. George Miller).
21 See infra Parts V.A-B.
22 Kerr-McGee Oil and Gas Company is now owned by Anadarko Petroleum Corporation. See
Russell Gold, Anadarko to Buy Kerr-McGee and Western Gas: Two Separate Deals Valued at
Combined $21.1 Billion, WALL ST. J., June 24, 2006, at A3.
23 See Kerr-McGee Oil & Gas Corp. v. Allred, No. 2:06CV0439, 2007 WL 3231634 (W.D.
La. 2007) [hereinafter Kerr-McGee District Court].
[Vol. 112
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of the DWRRA.24 This ruling was affirmed by the Fifth Circuit on January 12,
2009, and the Department of Interior's petition for certiorari was denied by the
United States Supreme Court on October 5, 2009.25 While the decision was the
legally correct one, its ultimate impact proved costly to the federal government.
Because of this ruling, there is virtually no distinction between the "blundered"
1998 and 1999 leases, and those which contained unenforceable price thre-
sholds.
As of the date of publication of this Note, all actions by Congress at-
tempting to mitigate the unforeseen impact of the Deep Water Royalty Relief
Act have focused only on the 1998 and 1999 leases. The Kerr-McGee ruling,
while legally accurate, strikes a major blow to congressional efforts in renego-
tiating the leases without price thresholds. The ruling also complicates Con-
gress's efforts in imposing price thresholds for future production from all 1996-
2000 leases, and virtually eliminates its ability to retroactively collect royalty
from these leases.2 6
The issue of royalty relief in offshore drilling is both complicated and
controversial - a troubling combination. This Note will attempt to clarify the
purpose and effect of royalty relief on offshore oil and gas production, and high-
light the controversial and costly issues that have arisen because of royalty re-
lief. Ultimately, this Note endorses legislative action in order to mitigate the
damaging effect the Deep Water Royalty Relief Act of 1995 has had on the
American people, and it assures the constitutionality of one example of such an
action.
Part II of this Note outlines the statutory framework surrounding the is-
suance of offshore oil and gas leases, providing a clear understanding of the
basics of federal offshore leasing. Part III will familiarize the reader with off-
shore royalty relief, a concept that has been riddled with strife since its incep-
tion. Part IV outlines the cost of royalty relief to the government and the Amer-
ican people, currently estimated at around $53 billion in lost revenue.27 Part V
summarizes the recent ruling in Kerr-McGee Oil & Gas Corp. v. Allred, and
explains the vast impact this case will have on royalty relief in the Gulf of Mex-
ico as well as the congressional efforts to recoup billions in lost revenue because
24 Id. at 4 (holding that "[t]he price threshold requirement found in Kerr-McGee's Mandatory
Royalty Relief leases is similarly unlawful under the plain text of the DWRRA because
DWRRA's § 304, applying to new leases, clearly requires minimum royalty relief. The Interior
has no discretion to enact a price threshold requirement that applies to volumes below the mini-
mum volume of royalty-free production.").
25 Kerr-McGee Oil & Gas Corp. v. U.S. Sec'y of Interior. 554 F.3d 1082 (5th Cir. 2009). cert.
denied, 130 S. Ct. 236 (2009) [hereinafter Kerr-McGee Fifth Circuit].
26 Because the Kerr-McGee litigation was upheld by the Fifth Circuit, the 1998 and 1999
leases without price thresholds are absolutely legal and enforceable, and a retroactive application
of price thresholds in contradiction to a valid statute could be considered a taking of a property
right in contradiction of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See infra Part VII for more
discussion on this subject.
27 See 2008 GAO REPORT, supra note 4. at 4.
2010]
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of royalty relief. Part VI discusses the proposed congressional actions to impose
price thresholds on 1998 and 1999 leases - specifically the Royalty Relief for
American Consumers Act. Part VII analyzes whether such efforts would be an
unconstitutional "taking" given the recent ruling in Kerr-McGee. Finally, Part
VIII discusses this author's recommendations for future congressional action
while taking into account the Kerr-McGee ruling as well as the constitutional
issues that may arise from what will obviously be a highly controversial and
likely litigated statutory enactment.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF OFFSHORE OIL & GAS LEASING
Offshore oil and gas leasing is governed by the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act of 1977 ("OSCLA"), and is run by the Department of the Interior.28
By the 1940s, it had been postulated by many geologists that vast petroleum
reserves existed beneath the continental shelf in the Gulf of Mexico. 29 Recog-
nizing the value of this reserve, President Harry Truman implemented the now-
famous Truman Doctrine, claiming exclusive federal jurisdiction over the natu-
ral resources on and below the outer continental shelf of the United States.30
The governance of offshore minerals and regulation of development activities
are bifurcated between state and federal law. 31 Generally, states have the power
to control offshore activities within three miles of its coast, while the federal
government and its regulatory regime governs from the state's offshore boun-
32dary to a minimum of 200 miles offshore.
Recognizing the national value of the outer continental shelf reserves,
Congress implemented the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act in 1977. 33 This
Act gives the Secretary of the Interior the power to lease the resources beneath
this federal land, and to deposit any revenue from these resources into federal
• 34
treasuries. The Act provides a comprehensive system that spans the entire life
of an oil and gas lease from development planning, leasing, exploration, to ulti-
mate production.3 5 In February of 2006, the Department of the Interior released
a comprehensive inventory of outer continental shelf ("OCS") resources that
28 See 43 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006).
29 Heersink, supra note 7, at 305.
30 Id.
31 JON 0. SHIMABUKURO, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT:
LEGAL FRAtEWORK 1 2 (July 14, 2006), available at https://www.policyarchive.org/bitstream!
handle/10207/2821/RL33404 20060714.pdf?sequence=l.
32 Id. at 2 3.
33 See 43 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006).
3 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (2006) ("The Secretary shall administer the provisions of this subchap-
ter relating to the leasing of the outer Continental Shelf, and shall prescribe such rules and regula-
tions as may be necessary to carry out such provisions.").
3 SHiMABuKuRo. supra note 31, at 4.
[Vol. 112
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estimated that 8.5 billion barrels of oil and 29.3 trillion cubic feet of natural gas
were present in the OCS.
36
In order to take advantage of these vast natural resources, OSCLA envi-
sions a leasing process that both protects the environment and produces a finan-
cial return to the federal government 7 The Department of the Interior's Miner-
als Management Service ("MMS") is responsible for managing the exploration
and development of offshore federal resources, and awards leases to interested
parties through a competitive, sealed bonus-bidding process. 38 The highest bid-
der is awarded the lease, and must pay an up-front cash payment called a "bonus
bid" in order to secure the lease. 39 The successful bidder must also pay an an-
nual rental fee in order to retain the right to develop the resources in the leasing
area for the life of the lease. 40 The rental fee is replaced by a royalty payment
- an annual payment to the federal government based on the amount of the
mineral produced that year - when and if the lease begins to produce oil or
natural gas. 41 The total revenue collected by the MMS each year from offshore
leasing fluctuates based on a number of factors including the market prices of
minerals, the location of the oil and gas wells, the lease terms, and the number
of lease sales.42 According to the MMS, the total revenue from the federal off-
shore oil and gas leasing program has recently averaged between five and seven
billion dollars per year.43 Thus, offshore oil and gas activities can be highly
profitable for both the oil and gas lessees and the federal government. Econom-
ic realities in the early and mid-1990s, however, made drilling in the deepest
parts of the continental shelf an unattractive investment. 44 The Secretary of the
Interior struggled to lease these lands to oil and gas companies which left the
United States with a potentially valuable yet untapped resource.
36 MARC HUMPHRIES, CRS REP. FOR CONG., OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF: DEBATE OF OIL AND
GAS LEASING AND REVENUE SHARING 14 (Jan. 22, 2008), available at
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/r133493.pdf [hereinafter OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF].
37 HuNMHRIES, supra note 18, at 2.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 See ERIN MASTRANGELO, ENERGY INFORMATION ADMIN., OFFICE OF OIL AND GAS,
OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL OFFSHORE ROYALTY RELIEF PROGRAM 1 (June 2006). available at
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/ftproot/features/ngoffshore.pdf.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 141 CONG. REC. HI 1854-01, HI 1860 (1995) (statement of Rep. Wicker) ("Let us look at the
facts. Right now, restrictive royalties have effectively shut down deep-water drilling. Only 6 per-
cent of the deep-water leases are in production. That is compared to 50 percent of leases which are
in production in shallow waters.").
2010]
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III. ROYALTY RELIEF
A. The Needfor an Incentive
By the early 1990's, oil and gas production in the Gulf of Mexico had
slowed to a standstill as most oil reservoirs in shallow waters had already be-
come depleted.45 Oil and gas reservoirs in deeper waters remained untapped, but
with oil prices at a mere $16 a barrel, production from these deep reservoirs was
simply not an economic reality. 46 Oil and gas companies began to lobby for help
from Congress in order to spur production from these potentially lucrative deep
47
water reserves.  With oil and gas companies paying the United States at least a
12.5% royalty from all production under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act,
the concept of royalty relief became the incentive of choice for oil companies. 48
In short, royalty relief allows oil and gas companies to develop and sell oil and
gas belonging to the United States without having to pay the usual 12.5% royal-
ty. After several years of failed efforts at implementing a royalty relief scheme,
Congress finally answered with the Deep Water Royalty Relief Act of 1995.49
B. The Deep Water Royalty ReliefAct of 1995: Enactment and Purpose
Recognizing the controversial nature of the Act, its supporters buried its
language in a much less controversial bill which lifted the ban on exporting
crude oil from Alaska's North Slope.50 While the Act had the support of the
45 Heersink, supra note 7, at 306.
46 See supra note 8 and accompanying text; see also Vague Law, supra note 17, at Al ("With
crude oil selling for about $16 a barrel, scores of wildcatters and small exploration companies had
gone out of business. Few companies had any stomach for drilling in water thousands of feet deep,
and industry leaders like Exxon and Royal Dutch Shell were increasingly focused on opportunities
abroad.").
47 141 CONG. REC. HI1854-01, HI1875 (1995) (statement of Rep. Miller) ("[O]il company
lobbyists have swarmed over the Hill. The oil corporations have hired Republicans, Democrats,
anybody to plead their special interest case. And the lobbying has come from the Clinton admin-
istration, too, that cut a special deal with the oil industry. It has been a massive lobbying effort.
You'd spend a lot of money on well-connected lobbyists, too, if the prize was a half billion dollars
for doing nothing more than you are doing right now.").
48 HUMPHRIES, supra note 18, at 2 ("In addition to the cash bonus bid, a royalty rate of 12.5%
or 16.66% has been imposed on the value of production. with royalties sometimes paid 'in kind.'
More recently, the MMS imposed an 18.75% royalty rate on its offshore leases.").
49 Pub. L. No. 104-58 (codified in part at 43 U.S.C. § 1337 (2006)).
50 Officially called the "Alaska Power Administration Asset Sale and Administration Ex-
ports of Alaskan North Slope Oil Act," the Bill ended the 22-year ban on exporting crude oil from
Alaska's North Slope. Speaking to the inclusion of the DWRRA into the Alaskan North Slope
Act, Representative Beilenson stated, "[lt]his controversial provision ought not to be a part of the
conference report before us; we ought not to waive the rule requiring germaneness so that this
controversial exemption for oil and gas producers a provision the house voted to oppose can
become law attached to a much less controversial bill." 141 CONG. REc. HI 1854-01, HI 1857
(1995) (statement ofRep. Beilenson).
[Vol. 112
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Clinton Administration and passed both the House and the Senate with ease,51
the Act's potential cost to the government was not withheld from congressional
52debate. Democratic Congressman George Miller of California, the key oppo-
nent of the Act, was well aware of its potential price tag to the American people.
He stated in debate:
[T]his debate today will not be about the underlying bill which
is overwhelmingly supported in this House but, rather, it is
about the hijacking of this bill by the Senate to include a royalty
holiday for the major oil companies that drill in what the Senate
says is deep water. That is a provision that we should not allow
to stand because it simply cannot be justified. It cannot be justi-
fied because it is a raid on the taxpayers of this country to pro-
vide one of the wealthiest industries in this country help that
they do not need.
While Congressman Miller and others made spirited efforts to block the
DWRRA's enactment, it nonetheless passed the Senate sixty-nine to twenty-
nine, with one abstention, and the House 289 to 134, with nine abstentions. 54 It
was signed by President Clinton on November 28, 1995. 55 The White House
Press Secretary stated that "providing deepwater royalty relief will reduce
America's dependence on unreliable sources of imported oil," noting that the
bill would also "contribute an extra $200 million in bonus and royalty payments
to the U.S. Treasury.,
56
C. Exploring the DWRRA." Three Types of Leases
The DWRRA creates three categories of deepwater leases based on the
location of the lease and the date of issuance of the lease.57 Leases issued prior
to the DWRRA's enactment on November 28, 1995 are generally referred to as
Pre-Act Leases.58 The amount of royalty relief provided for these leases is de-
termined by an economic evaluation in which the oil and gas company must
51 See 1995 WL 699656, Press Secretary's Statement on North Slope Oil Bill Signing (Nov.
28, 1995) [hereinafter Press Secretary's Statement] ("The Administration-backed measure also
provides new incentives that will stimulate oil and gas production in the United States ....").
52 The Act was verbally opposed by Representative Miller, Representative Beilenson, Repre-
sentative Vento, and Representative Scarborough. among others in House debate. 141 CONG.
REC. HI 1854-01 (1995).
53 141 CONG. REc. Hl1854-01, H11868 (1995) (statement of Rep. Miller).
54 See H.R. REP. No. 104-312 (1995) (Conf. Rep.).
55 Id.
56 See Press Secretary's Statement, supra note 5 1.
57 See Pub. L. No. 104-58, § 302; see also MASTRANGELO, supra note 40, at 2.
58 See 30 C.F.R. § 203.0 (2009).
2010]
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prove that drilling in that locality would not be economically feasible without
royalty relief.59 These leases are governed by section 302 of the DWRRA,
which expressly provides that no royalty relief is allowed if the price of oil or
gas meets a price threshold, as defined by Congress. 60 These price thresholds
have also been defined and implemented by MMS regulations. Specifically, the
regulations suspend royalty relief if oil prices exceed $28.00 per barrel. 61
62Leases issued after November 28, 2000 are called Post-Act Leases.
Royalty relief incentives under these leases are granted on a lease-specific basis,
based on an economic evaluation, and limited by specific royalty suspension
volumes.63 These leases are governed by section 303, and the Secretary is autho-
rized to provide royalty relief and to impose price thresholds.64
The final category of leases are referred to as Eligible Leases and are
65the leases at issue in this controversy. These leases were issued between No-
vember 28, 1995 and November 28, 2000 - the five years after the DWRRA
was passed.66 Under these leases, royalty relief is not based upon an economic
evaluation, but rather it is mandatory and automatic up to a specified volume of
product. 6' These leases are governed by section 304 of the DWRRA. 68 This
59 See Pub. L. No. 104-58. § 302(C)(ii) ("Upon submission of a complete application by the
lessee, the Secretary shall determine within 180 days of such application whether new production
from such lease or unit would be economic in the absence of the relief from the requirement to
pay royalties provided for by clause (i) of this subparagraph. In making such determination, the
Secretary shall consider the increased technological and financial risk of deep water development
and all costs associated with exploring, developing, and producing from the lease.").
60 See Pub. L. No. 104-58, § 302(C)(v) ("During the production of volumes determined pur-
suant to clauses (ii) or (iii) of this subparagraph, in any year during which the arithmetic average
of the closing prices on the New York Mercantile Exchange for light sweet crude oil exceeds
$28.00 per barrel, any production of oil will be subject to royalties at the lease stipulated royalty
rate.").
61 30 C.F.R. § 203.78(a) (2009) ("Suppose your base oil price threshold set under paragraph
(a) is $28.00 per barrel, and the daily closing NYMEX light sweet crude oil prices for the previous
calendar year exceeds $28.00 per barrel, as adjusted in paragraph (h) of this section. In this case,
we retract the royalty relief authorized in this section and you must: (1) Pay royalties on all oil
production for the previous year at the lease stipulated royalty rate plus interest ... and (2) Pay
royalties on all your oil production in the current year.").
62 See 30 C.F.R. § 203.0 (2009).
63 See MASTRANGELO, supra note 40, at 2.
64 See Pub. L. No. 104-58. § 303(H) ("[C]ash bonus bid with royalty at no less than 12 and '/2
per centum fixed by the Secretary in amount or value of production saved, removed, or sold, and
with suspension of royalties for a period, volume, or value of production determined by the Secre-
tary, which suspensions may vary based on the price of production from the lease .....
65 See 30 C.F.R. § 203.0 (2009).
66 See Pub. L. No. 104-58, § 304.
67 Id.
68 Section 304 of the DWRRA reads as follows:
For all tracts located in water depths of 200 meters or greater in the Western
and Central Planning Area of the Gulf of Mexico, including that portion of the
[Vol. 112
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provision specifically states that "the suspension of royalties shall be set at a
volume of not less than" the specific statutory volumes enumerated in the sta-
tute.69
The language of section 304 was recently interpreted in the Kerr-McGee
case - explained in detail in Part V - to mean that price thresholds added to
any lease in this five-year time period are illegal and unenforceable. 7° These
price thresholds, according to the Louisiana district court, would force royalty
payments at a volume less than, rather than "not less than" the statutory vo-
lumes. 71 As this ruling was unanimously affirmed by the Fifth Circuit on appeal,
royalty relief from all leases issued between 1996 and 2000 will be granted up
to the specified volume without any price threshold 2 Thus, as oil and gas pric-
es continue to rise, oil companies will continue to reap the benefits of royalty
relief.
Despite the foregone royalty payments that have and will continue to re-
sult from the royalty relief provisions of the DWRRA, the royalty "holiday,
73
had an immediate impact on offshore oil and gas leasing in the deep Gulf. Ac-
cording to the MMS, 3401 deepwater leases were sold under the DWRRA -
nearly 1400 more than would have been sold during the 1996-2000 period ab-
sent the DVRRA. 74 Additionally, the added cash bonus bids and rentals col-
Eastern Planning Area of the Gulf of Mexico encompassing whole lease
blocks lying west of 87 degrees, 30 minutes West longitude, any lease sale
within five years of the date of enactment of this title, shall use the bidding
system authorized in § 8(a)(1)(H) of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act,
as amended by this title, except that the suspension of royalties shall be set at
a volume of not less than the following:
(1) 17.5 million barrels of oil equivalent for leases in water depths of 200 to
400 meters;
(2) 52.5 million barrels of oil equivalent for leases in 400 to 800 meters of
water; and
(3) 87.5 million barrels of oil equivalent for leases in water depths greater
than 800 meters.
Id. (emphasis added).
69 Id. (emphasis added).
70 See infra Part V.
71 See Kerr-McGee District Court, 2007 WL 3231634 at *4 ("The Interior has no discretion to
enact a price threshold requirement that applies to volumes below the minimum volume of royal-
ty-free production.").
72 Kerr-McGee Fifth Circuit, 554 F.3d at 1082.
73 The word "holiday" was first introduced in congressional debate to describe the five-year
royalty-free period after the Act's enactment. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REc. H11854-01 (statement of
Rep. Miller) ("So there should be no doubt: this holiday is mandatory, regardless of need, regard-
less of facts, regardless of cost." (emphasis added)).
74 See MASTRANGELO, supra note 40. at 6.
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lected by the federal government from these leases totaled about $2 billion as of
June 2006. 7
D. Royalty Relief in Other Acts
Royalty relief is not unique to the DWRRA. The Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act ("OSCLA"), as amended in 1978, authorizes the Secretary of
'76the Interior to grant royalty relief to promote increased oil and gas production.
Even more recently, Congress passed the omnibus Energy Policy Act of 2005,
which provided additional royalty relief for certain offshore oil and gas leases]7
Specifically, this energy Act expanded the "Post-Act" royalty relief program of
the DWRRA by providing automatic suspension volumes at specified depths in
each lease. 78 The Energy Policy Act of 2005, like the "Post-Act" leases under
the DWRRA, allows the Secretary of the Interior to "place limitations on royalty
relief ... based on market price., ' 79 Royalty relief, whether stemming from the
DWRRA, the Energy Policy Act of 2005, or the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act, represents a balancing of interests. It must properly induce production in
75 Id.
76 See 43 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1) (2006) ("The Secretary is authorized to grant to the highest
responsible qualified bidder or bidders by competitive bidding, under regulations promulgated in
advance, any oil and gas lease on submerged lands of the outer Continental Shelf which are not
covered by leases meeting the requirements of subsection (a) of § 1335 of this title. Such regula-
tions may provide for the deposit of cash bids in an interest-bearing account until the Secretary
announces his decision on whether to accept the bids, with the interest earned thereon to be paid to
the Treasury as to bids that are accepted and to the unsuccessful bidders as to bids that are re-
jected. The bidding shall be by sealed bid and, at the discretion of the Secretary .... ").
77 See Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 345 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 15905
(2006)):
(b) SUSPENSION OF ROYALTIES. - The suspension of royalties under
subsection (a) shall be established at a volume of not less than--
(1) 5,000,000 barrels of oil equivalent for each lease in water depths of
400 to 800 meters:
(2) 9,000,000 barrels of oil equivalent for each lease in water depths of
800 to 1,600 meters;
(3) 12,000.000 barrels of oil equivalent for each lease in water depths of
1,600 to 2,000 meters; and
(4) 16,000.000 barrels of oil equivalent for each lease in water depths
greater than 2.000 meters.
(c) LIMITATION.--The Secretary may place limitations on royalty relief
granted under this section based on market price.
78 Id.
79 Id.
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areas that would not otherwise be exploited, yet not provide unfair benefits to
corporations that do not need it.80
IV. ROYALTY RELIEF'S COST TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE
This issue is unique because the problem of royalty relief does not im-
mediately reveal itself. Because production of oil and gas, especially offshore,
takes a significant amount of time to research, explore, and eventually produce,
any problem with royalty payments may not be exposed for many years. 81 By
the time many leases issued between 1996 and 2000 began producing oil or gas,
most members of Congress had forgotten about the Deep Water Royalty Relief
Act entirely. In fact, it was not until a New York Times article broke in February
2006 that the major problem of offshore royalty relief once again reached the
halls of Congress.
8 2
The story reported on a projection "buried in the Interior Department's
just-published budget plan" which found that the government would give up
more than $7 billion in foregone royalty payments from 2006-2011, "even
though the administration assumes that oil prices will remain above $50 a barrel
throughout that period. 83 This projected foregone royalty was based on 1031
leases issued between 1998 and 1999 that did not contain language limiting
royalty relief based on the market value of oil and natural gas. It was assumed
in this article, and all subsequent reactions to the article, that it was the 1998 and
1999 leases that were faulty. It was inconceivable at the time that the so-called
"blunder" of leaving out price thresholds in the 1998 and 1999 leases was ac-
tually consistent with the language of the statute, and that the 1996, 1997 and
2000 leases that did contain price thresholds were in fact flawed and unenforce-
able.1
4
California Congressman George Miller, who opposed the DWRRA
from the beginning, stated that the lack of price thresholds in the 1998 and 1999
leases is "the gift that keeps on giving" and is "one of the greatest train robbe-
ries in the history of the world."8 5 Because it takes years to explore and build
huge offshore drilling rigs, most of the oil and gas wells from the 1996-2000
80 Congress has struggled with this balance since the inception of royalty relief in the OCSLA
in 1978. The idea of a price threshold seems to be the best solution thus far conceived to strike
this proper balance.
8I In fact, most offshore leases never make it past the exploratory phase. Only about 8% of
DWRRA-eligible leases issued between 1996 and 2000 have been drilled. However, proved oil
and gas reserve and resource estimates have more than doubled since 2000 and the development
time has decreased from ten years in the mid-1990s to seven years in 2006. HUMPHRIES, supra
note 18, at 5.
82 See Royalty Plan. supra note 20.
83 Id.
84 See infra Part V.
85 Royalty Plan, supra note 20 (quoting Rep. George Miller).
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leases are just beginning to produce.8 6 According to the MMS, the amount of
royalty-free oil production, stemming entirely from the 1998 and 1999 leases
lacking price thresholds, will quadruple from 2006 to 2011, to 112 million bar-
rels.8 7 In part because of the New York Times article, House Republicans called
a hearing to address concerns over royalties being collected by the Interior De-
partment from offshore oil and gas leases.88 A report by the Government Ac-
countability Office ("GAO") was requested on the subject, and its results were
released on January 18, 2007.' 9
According to the original GAO report, royalty relief under the Outer
Continental Shelf Deep Water Royalty Relief Act of 1995 had cost the govern-
ment over $1 billion as of the date of the report, and the cost could rise to as
high as $80 billion for the life of the leases. 90 The report admitted, however,
that there was much uncertainty to its estimates because of the oscillating nature
of oil and gas prices, the ongoing Kerr-McGee litigation, and other inherent
complexities in forecasting future royalties. 91 Nonetheless, according to the
report, "[t]he MMS estimated that the cost of not including price thresholds on
the 1998 and 1999 leases could be as high as $10 billion. '9 2 Additionally, at the
time of the report in early 2007, the District Court's ruling in Kerr-McGee was
still ten months from issuance. While the report reflected no inherent prediction
as to the outcome of the case, it noted that if Kerr-McGee would win and "price
thresholds are disallowed for the leases [the Department of Interior] issued in
1996, 1997, and 2000, an additional $60 billion in royalty revenue could be
lost."'93 While it noted the legal challenge posed in Kerr-McGee and the poten-
tial consequence of an unfavorable ruling, the focus of the report, and all subse-
quent legislative reaction to it, still remained centered around the 1998 and 1999
leases lacking price thresholds. Perhaps foreseeing inevitable legislation on this
issue in the future, the report's authors concluded by reiterating the importance
of striking a balance between encouraging offshore production and ensuring a
fair rate of return for the American people.94
86 See id.; see also HuIPHRIES. supra note 18. at 5 (In the mid-1990s. it took nearly ten years
for a lease to enter the production phase, though this number has fallen to seven years in 2006.).
87 Royalty Plan, supra note 20.
88 See Edmund L. Andrews. Official Says Oil and Gas Giveaway Was Probably an Error.
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2006, at C3 [hereinafter Official Says Error].
89 See U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, OIL AND GAS ROYALTIES: ROYALTY
RELIEF WILL LIKELY COST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT BILLIONS, BUT THE FINAL COSTS HAVE YET
TO BE DETERMINED (2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07369t.pdf [hereinafter
2007 GAO REPORT].
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 7.
93 Id. at 8.
94 Id. at 13 (additionally stating that "[d]evelopment, however, should not mean that the Amer-
ican people forgo a reasonable rate of return for the extraction and sale of these resources, espe-
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V. KERR-MCGEE OIL & GAS CORP. V. ALLRED95
A. The District Court Ruling: Price Thresholds in § 304 Leases Are Con-
trary to the Unambiguous Language of the DWRRA.
On October 30, 2007, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Louisiana issued a ruling in Kerr-McGee Oil & Gas Corp. v. Allred that re-
buffed efforts of the U.S. Department of the Interior to collect royalties from
certain offshore oil and gas production leases based on price thresholds. More
simply, the Court held that the Secretary of the Interior does not have the au-
thority to impose price thresholds on any deepwater leases issued between 1996
and 2000 under the DWRRA.
96
Specifically at issue in Kerr-McGee were eight leases held by Kerr-
McGee Oil & Gas Corporation in the deepwater Gulf of Mexico. 97 All eight
leases were issued between 1996 and 2000 - making them section 304 leases
under the DWRRA - and all eight leases contained language limiting royalty
relief based on the market price of oil and natural gas.98 It was not until 2003
and 2004 that the price of natural gas and oil, respectively, exceeded the price
threshold specified in the leases. 99 When Kerr-McGee was ordered by the Sec-
retary of the Interior to begin paying royalties on these eight leases in what was
called the "Burton Decision," 100 the company refused and challenged the order
in federal court. ' 0'
Kerr-McGee argued that section 304 of the DWRRA, which addresses
lease sales during the five-year period between 1996 and 2000, barred the inclu-
sion of royalty relief price thresholds to these leases, and therefore the collection
of royalties resulting from the imposition of price thresholds contradicted sec-
tion 304 of the DWRRA.10 2 The Secretary of the Interior responded, arguing
that section 304's reference to section 303, which contains language relating to
cially in light of the current and long-range fiscal challenges facing our nation, high oil and gas
prices, and record industry profits.").
95 Kerr-McGee Fifth Circuit, 554 F.3d 1082; Kerr-McGee District Court, 2007 WL 3231634
(W.D. La. 2007).
96 Kerr-McGee District Court, 2007 WL 3231634 at *4.
97 Kerr-McGee Fifth Circuit, 554 F.3d at 1083.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 1084.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 See Kerr-McGee Oil & Gas Corporation's Opposition to Defendant's Cross-Motion for
Summary Judgment and Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 3, Kerr-McGee
Oil & Gas Corp. v. U.S. Sec'y of Interior, No. 08-30069 (5th Cir. Jan. 12, 2009), available at
2007 WL 2969695 ("There is no disputing that Interior's price threshold clauses reduce the vo-
lume of royalty-free production below the minimum volumes fixed by Congress in § 304 of the
[DW]RRA.").
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the Secretary's power to implement price thresholds, exhibits the proper con-
gressional intent to allow price thresholds in section 304 leases as well. 
1 03
The Court ruled in favor of Kerr-McGee's interpretation of the statute,
holding that the language of the statute was unambiguous and barred the inclu-
sion of price thresholds in 1996-2000 leases. °4 The Court based its ruling on a
previous Fifth Circuit opinion construing the language of section 304.105 In
Santa Fe Snyder Corp. v. Norton, the Fifth Circuit held that royalty relief under
section 304 leases applied to individual leases, rather than "fields."10 6 A field is
an area consisting of a single reservoir or multiple reservoirs within the same
geological structure or stratigraphic trapping condition and may contain more
than one lease.10 7 Section 302, which governs Pre-Act leases, makes royalty
relief contingent on the lease being a part of a non-producing field before the
DWRRA was enacted. 0 8 The Secretary of the Interior took this language from
section 302 and applied it to section 304 leases. 0 9 The Santa Fe Snyder court
found that the Interior's usurpation of section 302 language added a new pro-
duction requirement for section 304 leases - that the field had to be non-
producing prior to 1995 - which was contrary to the DWRRA. 10
Basing its decision primarily on the Santa Fe Snyder ruling, and its own
interpretation of sections 302, 303, and 304 of the DWRRA, the Kerr-McGee
court stated that
The Fifth Circuit interpreted Sections 303 and 304 of the
DWRRA as they pertain to new production requirements for
Mandatory Royalty Relief leases. Section 303 added a new
bidding system that gave the Interior the authority to lease any
water depth in any location with royalty relief fashioned accord-
ing to the Interior's discretion. The [Fifth Circuit] found that
this power, however, was tempered by the next section, where
Congress replaced the Interior's discretion to fashion royalty re-
lief with a fixed royalty suspension scheme based on volume
103 Id. ("Attempting to justify this reduction in royalty-free volumes, Interior relied on § 303 of
the [DW]RRA. which gives the agency the discretion to 'vary' royalty relief 'based on price of
production."').
104 Kerr-McGee District Court, 2007 WL 3231634 at *4.
105 See Santa Fe Snyder Corp. v. Norton, 385 F.3d 884 (5th Cir. 2004).
106 Id. at 892.
107 See 30 C.F.R. § 260.102 (2009).
108 See Pub. L. No. 104-58, § 302.
109 Santa Fe Snyder, 385 F.3d at 889 90.
110 Specifically, the court stated that "Section 304 mandates that, without exception, based only
on the objective factors of water depth, location of the lease block and date of the lease sale, all
leases meeting these objective criteria are entitled to receive the suspensions of royalties benefit.
which the Secretary may not set at a volume less than the particular volume assigned for each
water depth. The statute is unambiguous on this point." Id. at 891.
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and water depth. Thus, the royalty relief for Mandatory Royalty
Relief leases is automatic and unconditional.,"
Thus, the district court found that section 304 mandates royalty relief up to a
certain minimum volume of production, regardless of the market price of oil or
natural gas.
B. The Fifth Circuit Affirms: Price Thresholds in § 304 Leases Are Unen-
forceable
The Fifth Circuit heard oral arguments for the Kerr-McGee appeal on
December 12, 2008, and released its unanimous affirmance of the District
Court's ruling on January 14, 2009.112 In oral argument, the Secretary of the
Interior continued to argue that the Interior has the discretionary authority to
impose price thresholds based on section 303 of the DWRRA. 113 The Depart-
ment of the Interior's attorney, Michael Grey, stated that "the case, of course,
turns on the relationship between sections 303 and 304 of the Act," 114 and that
the exception under section 304 "preserves the price threshold authority and
takes away Interior's discretion only to determine the period volume or value of
production." ' 5  Kerr-McGee continued to argue that section 304 is unambi-
guous and gives oil and gas companies the right to produce a fixed volume of oil
or gas without paying royalties to the federal government. Jonathan Hunter, the
attorney for Kerr-McGee, argued that the Santa Fe Snyder ruling controlled and
that "section 304 modified the entirety of the discretion otherwise granted in
section 303. ' '16
Because an agency's interpretation of its own statutory authority was at
issue in this appeal, under the first step of the Chevron' 7 test the Fifth Circuit
first had to consider whether the statute, as passed by Congress, unambiguously
granted the Secretary of the Interior the authority to establish price thresholds in
section 304 leases." 8 The Court started its analysis by noting a cardinal rule of
H Kerr-McGee District Court, 2007 WL 3231634 at *4 (citations omitted).
112 Kerr-McGee Fifth Circuit, 554 F.3d 1082.
113 Oral Argument Before the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals on Dec. 12, 2008, Kerr-McGee
Oil & Gas Corp. v. U.S. Secretary of Interior, No. 08-30069 (5th Cir. Jan. 12, 2009) (Dec. 12,
2008), available at http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/OralArgumentRecordings.aspx (search "and/or
Docket number is:" for "08-30069"; then follow "Windows Media" hyperlink).
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The Chevron
test is a two-step analysis used when a judicial court reviews an agency's interpretation of a feder-
al statute. Id.
18 Kerr-McGee Fifth Circuit. 554 F.3d at 1084.
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statutory interpretation - that "a statute is to be read as a whole." 119 After not-
ing the language of sections 302 and 303 of the DWRRA, the Court stated that
"the pertinent language of [section 304] states that 'the suspension of royalties
shall be set at a volume of not less than the following' specifically established
volume thresholds." 120
The Court then directly analogized this case to its own Santa Fe Snyder
ruling, stating that "[t]he current case is the logical and inevitable extension of
Santa Fe Snyder, as the district court correctly reasoned. Here, as in that case,
Interior seeks to employ a royalty-relief limitation present in § 302 (which ap-
plies to leases existing prior to the DWRRA's enactment) in order to limit the
royalty relief granted to new leases by § 304."12 1 Addressing the Department of
the Interior's argument that section 304's reference to section 303 of the Act
extends the price threshold authority to section 304, the Court noted that "the
plain language of the statute does not bear Interior's interpretation.', 2 2  The
Court went on to reason that:
Interior's reading would render § 304's mandatory language
meaningless: if price thresholds trigger royalty payments be-
fore § 304's production volumes are exceeded, then the royalty
payment suspension is being set at a volume less than § 304's
specified production levels. While § 303 grants Interior discre-
tion to "vary" royalty relief for all new leases of submerged
lands on the Outer Continental Shelf based on the price of pro-
duction, § 304 "immediately excepts and replaces Interior's dis-
cretion with a fixed royalty suspension for [n]ew [leases on a
volume basis" where those new leases are located in the geo-
graphic region specified by § 304. Had Congress intended to
impose price thresholds on the royalty relief for these new leas-
123
es, it certainly knew how to do so.
Based on this reasoning, the court correctly held that "Section 304 is unambi-
guous in this regard, and it does not grant Interior the authority to impose price
thresholds that suspend royalty relief at production volumes less than those es-
tablished by Congress in § 304. ' '124
The court correctly alluded to its duty to read the statute in its entirety.
When read as a whole, it becomes clear that Congress intended royalty relief for
119 Id. (citing In re Supreme Beef Processors, Inc.. 468 F.3d 248. 253 (5th Cir. 2006) (en
banc)).
120 Id. at 1085 (citing Pub. L. No. 104-58, § 304).
121 Id. at 1086.
122 Id.
123 Id. (citation omitted).
124 Kerr-McGee Fifth Circuit. 554 F.3d at 1087.
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section 304 leases to be mandatory up to a specified volume.1 25 Section 302,
which deals with Pre-Act Leases, specifically includes a price threshold re-
quirement. 126 By including this requirement for one set of leases but not another,
Congress demonstrated its intent that the price threshold requirement would not
be applied to new leases issued between 1996 and 2000. Congress clearly knew
how to impose a price threshold requirement, but chose not to do so for a speci-
fied five-year period of leases. Presumably, Congress wanted to immediately
spur production in the Gulf of Mexico, and allowing mandatory and uncondi-
tional royalty relief for just a five year period would be a tempting incentive to
begin exploring and producing in the Gulf of Mexico within that period. '
21
C. The Legislative History of the DWRRA Supports the Kerr-McGee Rul-
ing
The legislative history of the DWRRA supports both Kerr-McGee's ar-
gument and the Fifth Circuit's decision. Congressional debate reveals that Con-
gress was willing to give up royalty payments in order to help free the United
States from dependence on foreign oil and create valuable jobs to bolster the
nation's economy. z8  During the legislative process, the House and Senate
passed differing bills designed to strengthen the energy sector.1 29 While the
uncontroversial Alaskan North Slope Act was common to both bills, only the
Senate version contained provisions relating to royalty relief in the Gulf of Mex-
ico. 130 The bills then went to a conference committee to work out the differenc-
es between the two bills.1 31  The conference committee agreed to the Senate
version of the bill, though it included several technical corrections and a new
provision clarifying that nothing in the royalty relief provisions shall be con-
125 Read in its entirety. the DWRRA clearly sets up three categories of deepwater leases based
on the location of the lease and the date of issuance of the lease. One must construe the statute as
a whole and assume the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius that the expression of
the one is the exclusion of the other. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 620 (8th ed. 2004).
126 Pub. L. No. 104-58, § 302(C)(v) ("During the production of volumes determined pursuant to
clauses (ii) or (iii) of this subparagraph. in any year during which the arithmetic average of the
closing prices on the New York Mercantile Exchange for light sweet crude oil exceeds $28.00 per
barrel, any production of oil will be subject to royalties at the lease stipulated royalty rate.").
127 Representative Brewster stated in debate that "[i]n just 15 years. the U.S. Department of
Energy warns that we will rely on foreign sources for 60 percent of our oil. Mr. Speaker. we must
invest in American workers. It is time to turn this situation around, and rely on our own abundant
oil and gas resources." 141 CONG. REC. H1I1854-01, H1I1860 (1995) (statement ofRep. Brewster).
128 See 141 CONG. REc. Hi1854-01, Hi1868 (1995) (statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee) ("[The
DWRRA] provides a real incentive to allow them to create the opportunity for jobs and to enhance
the domestic energy industry, which I believe is vital for this Nation's national security.").
129 See H.R. CoNF. REP. 104-312 (1995).
130 Id.
131 Id.
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strued to affect any offshore moratoriums. 132 Both the House and Senate then
debated over the conference report, with both branches eventually passing the
bill, including the controversial Senate-backed royalty relief provisions. 1
33
The question remains as to whether Congress intended royalty relief
during the five-year post-Act period to be automatic and mandatory up the spe-
cified volume, or whether it intended to allow the Secretary to retain the ability
to implement price thresholds, thus cutting off royalty relief if prices rose high
enough. In Senate debate, a proponent of the bill, former Democratic Senator
John Bennett Johnston of Louisiana stated, "For the next 5 years, deep water
leases will be offered for sale under the following terms: First, payment of an
upfront bonus bid, and second, waiver of the royalty on a fixed volume of oil and
gas based on the water depth of the lease." 1 34 It seems clear from Senator
Johnston's remarks that royalty relief for Eligible Leases would be based on
volume, not price. 31 In House debate, which was far more spirited, the major
opponent of the Act was Congressman George Miller of California.1 36 He re-
peatedly warned of the mandatory nature of the five-year royalty holiday, even
proposing a failed amendment to make royalty relief discretionary.13' He stated
in debate, "Don't let anyone tell you the royalty holiday is discretionary for new
leases. My amendment, offered in the conference, to make it clear the holiday is
discretionary was voted down. So there should be no doubt: this holiday is
mandatory, regardless of need, regardless of facts, regardless ofcost., 138
It is clear from congressional debate that at least some representatives
recognized the mandatory nature of Eligible Leases, stated this knowledge on
the record, and warned others of the potential problems that would be created by
a non-discretionary royalty relief policy. Nonetheless, Congress enacted the
Bill into law, and President Clinton signed it a few weeks later. 39 This legisla-
tive history overwhelmingly supports Kerr-McGee's argument that the five-year
royalty "holiday" is mandatory, and any efforts by the Secretary of the Interior
132 Id.
133 See 141 CONG. REc. Hl1854-01 (1995); 141 CONG. REC. S17019-03 (1995) see also Deep
Water Royalty Relief Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-58 (codified in part at 43 U.S.C. § 1337
(2006)).
134 141 CONG. REc. S17019-03. S12023 (1995) (statement of Sen. Johnston) (emphasis added).
135 Interestingly, see Senator's Johnston's remarks in the New York Times eleven years later, in
2006, when he stated that "[t]he one thing I can tell you is that this is not what we intended."
Vague Law, supra note 17.
136 See 141 CONG. REC. HI 1854-01 (1995) (statement of Rep. Miller).
137 Id.
138 Id. at HI 1875-76. Miller also stated that "[t]here is no need for this. The problem with this
is, it is mandatory. It is not that the oil company makes a showing that, but for this, they would
have drilled the well, or that they need it. It is mandatory. When they sink the well, they get up to
72 million barrels of oil, royalty free, for simply being there, doing what they were already going
to do." Id. at H11857.
139 See 1995 WL 699656, Press Secretary's Statement on North Slope Oil Bill Signing (Nov.
28, 1995).
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to implement a price threshold that would cut off royalty relief below the statu-
tory minimum volumes would be contrary to Congress's intent. This history,
along with the clear language of the statute, supports the finding of both the
District Court of Louisiana and the Fifth Circuit on appeal.
D. The Impact. The Federal Government Will Lose Billions of Dollars in
Expected Royalty Revenue
The Fifth Circuit's ruling in Kerr-McGee was simple and direct. The
federal government could not enforce price thresholds on any leases issued in
140the deep water Gulf of Mexico between 1996 and 2000 under the DWRRA.
Thus, the repeated accusations of a colossal rip-off by the oil and gas industry
since 2006 by lawmakers and the media were immediately tempered by the rea-
lization that the 1998 and 1999 leases - for an entire year loathed as an indus-
try swindle - were in fact made pursuant to a valid statute. The irony, though,
did not land softly on legislators, who continued to attempt to rectify what many
still deem to be corporate welfare at its worst. 141
Even after Kerr-McGee filed suit in the District Court of Louisiana, the
focus on Capitol Hill remained centered around the leases entered into in 1998
and 1999 that did not include price thresholds. Democratic Representative Ed-
ward Markey of Massachusetts downplayed the Kerr-McGee lawsuit as mere
intransigence on the part of the oil company and accused it of attempting a "co-
lossal rip-off."1 42 Representative Markey went on to state that the Kerr-McGee
suit "is nothing more than a brazen attempt to fleece the American people out of
billions of dollars." 43 Media reports and congressional debate repeatedly re-
ferred to the "inexplicable" mistake made by the MMS in failing to include
price threshold provisions in 1998 and 1999 offshore leases. 144 MMS's initial
attempt to rectify its "mistake" focused on renegotiation. Government officials
attempted to negotiate with twelve of the fifty-six companies holding these 1998
and 1999 leases, 145 eventually succeeding in renegotiating price thresholds into
the leases held by four oil and gas companies. 146
Until the Kerr-McGee holding in October 2007, the government had
significant bargaining power in renegotiation. Government negotiators had leg-
islators, President Bush, and most importantly, the media on their side. As re-
140 See supra Part V.B.
141 See infra Parts VI.A-B.
142 Edmund L. Andrews, Oil Company Revives Suit on Avoidance of Royalties, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 3, 2007, at C3 [hereinafter Oil Company Revives Suit].
143 Id.
144 See, e.g., Official Says Error, supra note 88.
145 Edward T. Pound, A Billion Here, a Billion There... How One Big Goof in a Little-Known
Federal Agency Gave Taxpayers a Big Black Eye, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 18, 2006.
146 Id.
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ported in the New York Times, "According to Republicans and Democrats alike,
[the DWRRA] was supposed to include an escape clause: in any year when av-
erage spot prices for oil or gas climbed above certain threshold levels, compa-
nies would pay full royalties instead." 147 Even the bill's principal architect and
supporter, Senator John Bennett Johnston of Louisiana, stated that "[t]he one
thing I can tell you is that this is not what we intended .... I got out the lan-
guage [of the DWRRA] a few days ago .... I had it out just long enough to
know that it's got a lot of very obscure language."
148
There were few involved in the matter that gave the Kerr-McGee argu-
ment much weight, including oil and gas industry lobbyists. John Northington,
a lobbyist who worked in the Energy Department under President Clinton,
stated that "there are a lot of folks in the industry, particularly those involved in
advocating the original legislation, that absolutely don't agree with Kerr-
McGee."' 4 9  Even the Bush administration repeatedly admitted that Kerr-
McGee's argument lacked merit. 150
After the District Court's holding in Kerr-McGee, Congress recognized
that it would need further ammunition if it wished to put an end to the oil indus-
try's offshore oil and gas royalty "holiday." Therefore, in June of 2008, when
oil prices had reached an all-time high and the price of oil was well over $100
per barrel, Congress asked the GAO to update its scenario as to the potential
losses from foregone royalty in DWRRA leases. Assuming that oil and gas
prices remained over $100 per barrel, the GAO reported that the government
could sustain losses as high as $14.7 billion over the next twenty-five years
from the 1998 and 1999 leases alone. 52 With regard to the 1996, 1997, and
2000 leases, the report found that if Kerr-McGee is upheld - which it now has
been -the federal government would have to refund $1.13 billion in royalties
that have already been collected from these leases.153 In addition, the GAO es-
timated that the government would be facing additional foregone royalty reve-
nues as high as $3 8.3 billion over the next twenty-five years. 1 54 Thus, according
to this report, the overall total of future foregone royalties could be as high as
$53 billion now that the Kerr-McGee decision has been upheld. 155 This number
is less than the MMS estimation of 2004, which estimated the total loss to be as
147 Vague Law, supra note 17.
148 Id.
149 Oil Company Revives Suit, supra note 142.
150 Id. ("The Bush administration has repeatedly argued that Anadarko's case has no merit, but
Interior officials have tried at least twice to settle the dispute without going to trial.").
151 2008 GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at 2.
152 Id. at3.
153 Id. at 3-4.
154 Id. at 4.
155 Id.
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high as $80 billion. 156 This is largely because of an over assumption of the
productivity of the 1996-2000 leases. 
1 57
The GAO further noted that there are currently eighty-four leases issued
in 1996, 1997, and 2000 that are producing or capable of producing in the fu-
ture. 1 58 Because seventy-six of those will never be able to produce enough to
exceed the royalty suspension volume, only eight leases will be subject to royal-
ty payments at all because of the recent decision in Kerr-McGee.159 Thus, a
mere 14% of these leases are royalty bearing. There were 1031 leases issued in
1998 and 1999, and of those 526 are active and 19 are currently producing. 160
Because these leases do not contain price thresholds, all would be royalty free
until the statutory volumetric limit is met. These numbers reveal a simple fact:
a huge majority of deep water Gulf of Mexico leases will never be subject to
royalty payments for the entire life of the lease. This adds up to billions of dol-
lars that the oil companies will keep, and the federal government will not col-
lect.
Oil and gas companies operating under leases issued between 1996 and
2000 are now, thanks to Kerr-McGee, legally free of the burden of royalty pay-
ments. Is it fair, though, to give the oil and gas companies this benefit now that
oil and gas prices are high enough to sustain exploration and production in the
deep waters of the Gulf of Mexico? The DWRRA's goal was to incentivize
immediate exploration of offshore areas that would otherwise be uneconomical
to explore. 16 1 Oil and gas prices are now over 600% higher than they were at
the time the Act was passed.162 Is it fair for oil and gas companies to continue
to reap the benefit of an incentive that is no longer needed? Many lawmakers
feel that it is indeed not fair, and despite the Fifth Circuit's ruling in Kerr-
McGee, have attempted to enforce a remedy through legislation.
VI. PROPOSED CONGRESSIONAL ACTIONS
A. Congressional Efforts to Correct the "Blundered" 1998-1999 Leases.-
The RRA CA
Both the House and Senate have made several attempts to correct the
"blunder" of not including price thresholds in the 1998 and 1999 leases under
156 See 2007 GAO REPORT, supra note 89, at 2.
157 2008 GAO REPORT, supra note 4, at 7.
158 Id. at 8.
159 Id.
160 HuNT HRIES, supra note 18, at 6.
161 See supra Part III.B.
162 See 2008 GAO REPORT, supra note 4. at 8.
2010]
23
Bergstrom: The Gift that Keeps on Giving: An Examination of the Growing Prob
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2010
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
the DWRRA.163 However, despite several bills that have been passed in the
House, no bill containing language that would impose a price threshold in Eligi-
ble DWRRA leases has yet been enacted into law. The purpose of these bills
has focused largely on the 1998 and 1999 leases that do not contain price thre-
shold language.1 64 No bill has yet to properly address the ramifications of the
Kerr-McGee litigation, which now signifies that the 1996, 1997 and 2000 leases
also lack enforceable price thresholds. If Congress wishes to properly include
price thresholds in all 1996-2000 DWRRA leases, it must address the outcome
of the Kerr-McGee case specifically and clearly include all 1996-2000 leases.
The first major Act to include a remedy for missing price thresholds in
the 1998 and 1999 leases was found within H.R. 2809, and was known as the
Royalty Relief for American Consumers Act of 2007 ("RRACA"). 165 This Act
was applicable to all leases issued "during the period of January 1, 1998,
through December 31, 1999.,166 The Act first clarified the Secretary of the Inte-
rior's authority to impose a price threshold on all section 304 leases of the
DWRRA. 167 The Act then attempted to rectify the missing price thresholds of
the 1998 and 1999 leases by creating an incentive system that would encourage
the lessees of these applicable leases to do one of three things: (1) the lessee
could renegotiate the lease to include a price threshold, (2) the lessee could pay
a "conservation of resources" fee established by the Secretary of the Interior, or
(3) the lessee could refuse to either renegotiate or pay the fee, and become in-
eligible for future Gulf of Mexico leases. 168 The Act, then, required the lessee
to either abide by a price threshold which it did not originally agree to, pay a
fee, or never get a lease again in the Gulf of Mexico.
Though H.R. 2809 did not pass the House, nearly identical language
was introduced and passed in the House as incorporated into the CLEAN Ener-
gy Act of 2007,169 the Renewable Energy and Energy Conservation Tax Act of
2007, 170 and the Comprehensive American Energy Security and Consumer Pro-
163 See, e.g., Comprehensive American Energy Security and Consumer Protection Act, H.R.
6899, 110th Cong. (2008); Renewable Energy and Energy Conservation Tax Act of 2007, H.R.
3221, 110th Cong. (2007): CLEAN Energy Act of 2007. H.R. 6, 110th Cong. (2007): New Apollo
Energy Act of 2007, H.R. 2809. 110th Cong. (2007).
164 See, e.g., CLEAN Energy Act of 2007, H.R. 6, 110th Cong. (2007) (The Act was applicable
to all leases issued "during the period of January 1, 1998, through December 31, 1999.").
165 New Apollo Energy Act, H.R. 2809, 110th Cong., Title VIII, Subtitle B (2007) (Title VIII is
entitled the "Royalty Relief for American Consumers Act of 2007.").
166 See id. § 812.
167 Id. § 813.
168 See id. § 814; see also ADAM VANN, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, IMPACT OF THE Kl-RR-
McG'l Oil & GAS CORP. v LLRE'1) RULING ON THE PROPOSED ROYALTY RELIEF FOR AMERICAN
CONSUMERS ACT OF 2007 2 (2007), available at http://globalwarming.house.gov/tools/assets/
files/0203.pdf.
169 CLEAN Energy Act of 2007, H.R. 6, 110th Cong. (2007).
170 Renewable Energy and Energy Conservation Tax Act of 2007, H.R. 3221. 110th Cong.
(2007).
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tection Act of 2008.171 All of these Acts include the RRACA as a subtitle,
which continues to utilize the incentive system to incorporate price thresholds in
the 1998 and 1999 DWRRA leases. The RRACA applies to what it refers to as
a "covered lease."'1 72 The Act defines a covered lease as "a lease for oil or gas
production in the Gulf of Mexico" which: (1) is "in existence on the date of
enactment of this Act;" (2) was "issued by the Department of the Interior under
§ 304 of the Outer Continental Shelf Deep Water Royalty Relief Act;" and (3) is
currently "not subject to limitations on royalty relief based on market price that
are equal to or less than the price thresholds described in" section 302 of the
DWRRA. 1
73
As of the date of publication of this Note, neither the RRACA nor any
other bill with similar language has yet become law. All House bills containing
the RRACA during the I I0 th Congressional term failed to pass in the Senate.
The I I 1th Congress has yet to introduce a bill with language similar to the
RRACA. However, the U.S. Supreme Court's recent denial of the Department
of Interior's petition for writ of certiorari in the Kerr-McGee case on October 5,
2009 may provide the spark necessary to reinvigorate the debate on Capitol
Hill. 1 74 Furthermore, President Barack Obama has expressed a concern over
"excessive royalty relief," urging Congress to assess ways to target oil and gas
companies receiving unwarranted windfalls. 1
75
B. The Failure to Specifically Account for the Kerr-McGee Ruling
Even though the RRACA was clearly an effort to remedy the perceived
"error" in the 1998 and 1999 leases by forcing a renegotiation of those leases,
the definition of "eligible leases" in the RRACA would likely include all 1996-
2000 leases, given the recent ruling in Kerr-McGee. The definition of covered
leases is not restricted to those leases without price thresholds in the terms and
conditions of the lease, or any other definition contingent upon the language of
the lease. The definition encompasses any lease that is not "subject to limita-
tions on royalty relief' based on oil or natural gas market prices.176 As the Fifth
Circuit has now affirmed the District Court in Kerr-McGee, all leases from
1996-2000 are no longer subject to limitations on royalty relief based on the
market price of oil and gas, and thus all would be eligible leases under the Act.
171 Comprehensive American Energy Security and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 6899, 110th
Cong. (2008).
172 See New Apollo Energy Act of 2007. H.R. 2809, Title VIII, Subtitle B § 814(d), 110th
Cong. (2007).
73 Id.
174 See Jennifer A. Dlouhy, High Court Rebuffs U.S. Bid to Halt Energy Royalty Relief MY SA
NEWS, Oct. 6, 2009, available at http://www.mysanantonio.com/business/-igh court rebuffs
US bid to halt energy royaltyrelief.html.
175 Id.
176 H.R. 2809. Title VIII, Subtitle B § 814(d).
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This means, then, that all section 304 DWRRA lessees, whether or not their
leases contain language concerning price thresholds, would either have to rene-
gotiate their lease, pay the conservation of resources fee, or forfeit eligibility for
future oil or gas production leases in the Gulf of Mexico.
If Congress wishes to ensure that all leases issued within the first five
years after the passage of the DWRRA are limited by price thresholds, then it
should pass the RRACA as it is currently written.' Congress should, however,
expressly note that the RRACA applies to all section 304 DWRRA leases. This
would specifically address the Kerr-McGee holding, and clarify the RRACA's
current ambiguity in this regard. If, however, Congress wishes to force only the
1998 and 1999 lessees to renegotiate their leases, then the definition of an "eli-
gible lease" should be amended accordingly. 178 This route, however, would
allow three years of deepwater leases to remain completely free of the obliga-
tion to pay royalty, and would preserve an inconsistency with the 1998 and 1999
leases.
As discussed supra in Part V, it seems clear that the congressional intent
of the DWRRA was to immediately spur production in the Gulf of Mexico by
offering a five-year royalty-free "holiday" up to the specific volumetric limit.
179
The District Court and the Fifth Circuit in Kerr-McGee affirmed that reasoning,
holding that Congress intended there to be no price-threshold on any section 304
leases.1 80 If Congress now wishes to unilaterally back out of its contractual
agreement, it must be wary of a nearly certain impending litigation by oil and
gas companies.' The holders of 1998 and 1999 leases will argue that they
177 See VANN, supra note 168.
178 Id.
179 See supra Part V.C.
180 See Kerr-McGee Oil & Gas Corp. v. Allred, 2007 WL 3231634 (W.D. La. 2007) (holding
that "lt]he price threshold requirement found in Kerr-McGee's Mandatory Royalty Relief leases is
similarly unlawful under the plain text of the DWRRA because DWRRA's § 304, applying to new
leases, clearly requires minimum royalty relief. The Interior has no discretion to enact a price
threshold requirement that applies to volumes below the minimum volume of royalty-free produc-
tion."); Kerr-McGee Oil & Gas Corp. v. U.S. Sec'y of Interior. 554 F.3d 1082 (5th Cir. 2009).
181 See Letter from John B. Breaux, on behalf of the Ad Hoc Deep Water Exploration and Pro-
duction Coalition, to the Honorable Max Baucus, Chairman of the Committee on Finance, and the
Honorable Chuck Grassley, Ranking Member of the Committee on Finance (Nov. 6, 2007) (on
file with Patton Boggs. LLP). The letter stated, in part:
Enactment of legislation directly or indirectly imposing price thresholds now
on 1998-99 deep water OCS leases would unfairly confiscate an important
property interest of leaseholders and violate their contractual rights. Without
question. the legislation would be subject to serious legal challenges as an un-
constitutional 'taking' without just compensation under the Fifth Amendment,
as well as a breach of contract. An adverse ruling could subject the govern-
ment to injunctive and declaratory relief. and billions in compensatory dam-
ages. Given the court's decision for summary judgment in the Kerr-McGee
litigation, Congress should know a lawsuit is likely.
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properly bargained for their price-threshold-less leases, and do not deserve to be
punished simply because the price of oil and gas has risen faster than ex-
pected. 182 Additionally, the holders of 1996, 1997, and 2000 leases will argue
that the Department of the Interior unilaterally imposed the price threshold in
their leases, and collected royalties accordingly. These lessees will argue that,
because of this prior cooperation, they should not be forced to forego future
leases in the Gulf of Mexico according to the new Act. These arguments raise
an array of constitutional and contractual issues which will undoubtedly arise if
the RRACA is enacted into law.
VII. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PROPOSED CONGRESSIONAL ACTIONS:
THE TAKINGS ARGUMENT
The strength of the American legal system is due, in part, to its combi-
nation of statutory, regulatory, constitutional, and common law mechanisms into
a single system of law. 8 3 This diversity of law allows a creative and opportu-
nistic attorney to apply a variety of arguments to any legal issue. 184 As the price
thresholds included in section 304 leases under the DWRRA have now been
found to be contrary to an unambiguous statute, any legislative attempt to im-
pose a threshold will raise a host of legal challenges by the oil and gas industry.
The opportunistic oil and gas industry lawyer will take advantage of this legal
system's diversity and argue a multitude of legal theories in order to halt pro-
posed legislative action. These theories will likely include: (1) an unconstitu-
tional taking, (2) substantive due process and equal protection violations, (3) the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, (4) breach of contract, and (5) unilateral
and mutual mistake. 185 As the scope of this Note is limited, only the first and
most likely argument of the oil and gas industry will be analyzed.
The takings argument was raised by those lawmakers who opposed the
proposed legislation in congressional debate, as well as by oil and gas industry
lobbyists. While debating what was then titled the "CLEAN Energy Act of
2007 " 186 on the floor of the House of Representatives, several Representatives
strongly urged that the incentive system utilized in the provisions regarding
royalty relief would constitute an unconstitutional regulatory taking. Represent-
ative Steve Pearce from New Mexico stated that "the very damaging thing about
182 Perhaps the holders of 1998 and 1999 leases paid a higher bonus or rental value for a lease
which did not contain a price threshold term.
183 ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND
SOCIETY 74 (3d ed. 2004).
184 Id.
185 See ROBERT MELTZ & ADAM VANN, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, LEGAL ISSUES RAISED BY
PROVISION IN HOUSE ENERGY BILL (H.R. 6) CREATING INCENTIVES FOR CERTAIN OCS
LEASEHOLDERS TO ACCEPT PRICE THRESHOLDS (Apr. 16, 2007), available at
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33974-200704 16.pdf.
186 CLEAN Energy Act of 2007, H.R. 6. 110th Cong. (2007).
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this bill today was it violated a constitutional provision that prohibits the Federal
Government from taking private property."18 7 Representative Doug Lamborn of
Colorado added that "there is a flaw in this bill that goes even deeper and touch-
es on our oath to uphold the United States Constitution. . . . This bill forces
owners of certain oil and gas leases to renegotiate those leases and forces them
to forgo all economic benefits from those leases until they do so. This is a clear
violation of the fifth amendment."' 8 Finally, Representative Gohmert of Texas
vehemently opposed the bill, stating that:
Our forefathers tried to protect against [a king who broke his
word regularly], so they inserted in the Bill of Rights a fifth
amendment provision called the takings clause that says you
shall not take private property for public use without just com-
pensation. Now this bill basically says if you don't renegotiate
your lease, you can't get any more leases on your existing lease.
You can't have economic benefit. That is one of the things.
The Penn Central case from 1978 made clear what the test was,
and this rises to the level of a regulatory taking. 18 9
Industry lobbyists have also indicated that a takings argument will be
first on their list of potential claims if the proposed Royalty Relief for American
Consumers Act is passed into law. The Ad Hoc Deep Water Exploration and
Production Coalition has stated that enactment of legislation imposing price
thresholds on DWRRA leases would "be subject to serious legal challenges as
an unconstitutional 'taking' without just compensation under the Fifth Amend-
ment."' 190 The Coalition also added that "[a]n adverse ruling could subject the
government to injunctive and declaratory relief, and billions in compensatory
damages," and noted that "Congress should know a lawsuit is likely."' 91 Given
that an unconstitutional takings argument has been mentioned by multiple par-
ties in several settings, it is the most likely and most visible argument the oil and
gas companies will argue in litigation if the proposed legislation is passed.
The Fifth Amendment of our Constitution provides, in pertinent part,
that "private property [shall not] be taken for public use without just compensa-
tion." 1 92 The purpose of the Takings Clause is to prevent the government "from
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and just-
ness, should be borne by the public as a whole."' 193 However, because an Act of
187 153 CONG. REC. H750 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 2007) (statement of Rep. Pearce).
188 Id. at H704 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 2007) (statement of Rep. Lamborn).
189 Id. at H705 (daily ed. Jan 18, 2007) (statement of Rep. Gohmert).
190 See Letter from John B. Breaux, supra note 181.
191 Id.
192 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
193 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
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Congress is being challenged, the oil and gas companies must mount a facial
challenge to the Act and show that the "mere enactment of the [Act] consti-
tute[s] a taking."'9 4 Additionally, "[a] facial challenge to a legislative act is ...
the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must
establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be va-
lid."' 95 This is a stringent test, and the burden is high for the oil and gas compa-
nies at the outset. 1
96
The U.S. Supreme Court has distinguished between two separate types
of Takings Clause situations: a physical taking and a regulatory taking. A phys-
ical taking occurs when there is a condemnation of property or where there is a
physical appropriation of property in which the property transfers from one enti-
ty to another.1 97 A regulatory taking, on the other hand, occurs when there is
some sort of significant restriction placed upon an owner's use of his property
for which "justice and fairness" requires that compensation be given. 98 A sepa-
rate analysis structure has developed for the two types of cases. Courts generally
apply uncomplicated per se rules when addressing physical takings. 199 For
regulatory takings, a three-part factual inquiry has developed. A court evaluat-
ing whether a regulation "goes too far'" 200 must ask: (1) what is the economic
impact of the regulation, (2) whether the government action interferes with rea-
sonable investment-backed expectations, and (3) what is the character of the
government action?201 This is known as the Penn Central analysis.
20 2
Because both types of takings require an interference with a property
right, the first issue in a takings analysis is to determine whether a property right
exists at all. What property rights will the oil and gas companies argue are be-
ing improperly taken by this proposed legislation? Several potential interests
include: (1) a property interest in future Outer Continental Shelf ("OCS") leases,
(2) a property interest in the existing leases lacking price thresholds, and (3) a
property interest in their money that would have to be paid as the "conservation
of resources fee." In effect, the oil and gas companies will argue that the gov-
ernment is forcing them to renegotiate an important and valuable lease term, and
that coercion of this nature is either a physical or a regulatory taking. If the
194 Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24, 52 (1st Cir. 2002) (dissenting opinion) (quoting
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 318 (2002)).
195 Id. (quoting Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, 77 (1st Cir
2001)).
196 Id.
197 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. 302.
198 Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962).
199 Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 312.
200 Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 ("The general rule at least is, that while prop-
erty may be regulated to a certain extent, if that regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking.").
201 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
202 Id.
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companies refuse to negotiate they would lose property right (1) above, while if
they decide to negotiate they would lose either property right (2) or (3) above.
Thus, the oil and gas companies will argue that the incentive system of the pro-
posed legislation is an unconstitutional taking of property without just compen-
sation no matter whether they: (a) refuse to negotiate and lose their future right
to lease OCS property, or (b) choose to negotiate with the federal government
and either pay a fee or insert a price threshold into existing OCS leases.
A. Because There Is No Property Right in Future OCS Leases, There Is
Not an Unconstitutional Taking if the Oil and Gas Companies Refuse to
Negotiate.
The oil and gas companies' argument will likely fail, however, for a
number of reasons. To begin with, the first argument that the oil and gas com-
panies have a valid property right in future OCS leases is, according to the facts
currently available, untrue.20 3 An existing lease is in the nature of a contract,
and contract rights are generally deemed to be a property right in Takings
Clause jurisprudence.20 4 However, it does not appear that there is any language
in any OCS lease issued under the DWRRA that contains an explicit right to bid
on future OCS leases. 20 5 According to the leases issued to Kerr-McGee Oil &
Gas Corporation in 1998 and 1999 - the leases at issue in the Kerr-McGee case
- the oil company had no express contractual right to bid on future leases in the
Gulf of Mexico.
20 6
Thus, while a valid contract is considered a form of property under tak-
ings jurisprudence, the right to obtain future contracts is not considered a "prop-
erty right." The government may negotiate, or refuse to negotiate, with any
party that it wishes.20 7 Therefore, lacking language in an existing contract that
in some way expresses or guarantees an explicit right to bid on future OCS leas-
es, the oil and gas companies have no property right in future OCS leases. Be-
cause there is no existing property right, there can be no unconstitutional taking
if the oil and gas companies refuse to negotiate with the federal government.
B. Because Negotiation Is Voluntary, There Is Not an Unconstitutional
Taking if the Oil and Gas Companies Choose to Negotiate
The oil and gas companies' more cogent argument is that the "incen-
tive" of future OCS leasing is so important and economically vital for their
203 MELTZ & VANN, supra note 185, at 3.
204 See, e.g., United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1. 19 n.16 (1977) ("Contract
rights are a form of property and as such may be taken ...provided that just compensation is
paid.").
205 MELTZ & VANN, supra note 185, at 3.
206 See 62 Fed. Reg. 39863-01 (1997).
207 See 43 U.S.C. § 1331. et. seq. (2006).
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companies, that they have no choice but to accept the negotiation offered by the
government. According to the oil and gas companies, being unable to obtain
future leases in the Gulf of Mexico, one of the largest domestic reservoirs of
available oil and gas, is not an economically viable option. Because the compa-
nies have no choice, the regulation unfairly and unjustly "takes" a property right
to their existing lease contracts. As noted above, a lease is generally deemed to
be a property right in Takings jurisprudence. 2 8 Thus, by forcing the companies
to write in a lease term that does not currently exist in their leases (an enforcea-
ble price threshold), the government is unfairly taking a valid contractual prop-
erty right.
This argument, however, must also fail. Nothing in the Royalty Relief
for American Consumers Act directly forces an oil and gas company to change
this term. 20 9 Because the Act simply creates an incentive for the company to
renegotiate the term, any change in the contractual lease would be a voluntary
action by the lessee. The general rule is that a voluntary action cannot provide
210grounds for a takings claim. In the seminal case introducing this principal,
Bowles v. Willingham, the U.S. Supreme Court was asked to analyze the consti-
tutionality of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 ("EPCA") that called for
the stabilization or reduction of rents for housing in what the government
deemed to be "defense-rental areas.'' In particular, the EPCA led to twenty-
eight areas in the United States to be deemed defense-rental areas which became
subject to a reduction in housing rents.212 Strikingly similar to the current con-
troversy, the 1942 EPCA forced certain landlords to reduce the value of their
current leases.
Addressing the argument that this forced rent reduction is an unconstitu-
tional taking, Justice Douglas reasoned that, because nothing in the EPCA "re-
quire[s] any person to sell any commodity or to offer any accommodations for
rent," there is no takings violation.213 Essentially, because the landlords could
choose to use the apartments for purposes other than housing (leave the building
vacant or dispose of it on the market), compliance with the Act would be volun-
tary and thus not an unconstitutional taking of property. Justice Douglas went
on to note that, even though the regulation may reduce the value of the regulated
property because of the price control measures, "that does not mean that the
regulation is unconstitutional."' 2  In fact, "[a] member of the class which is
regulated may suffer economic losses not shared by others. His property may
208 See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
209 See supra Part VIA.
210 See Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 517-18 (1944).
211 Act of July 9. 1952. ch. 608. Part 1. § 101, 66 Stat. 481, repealed by Act of Aug. 10. 1956,
ch. 1041. § 53, 70A Stat. 641, 682; Bowles, 321 U.S. at 505 06.
212 Bowles, 321 U.S. at 506.
213 Id. at 517.
214 Id.
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lose utility and depreciate in value as a consequence of regulation. 215  The
court thus held that, because the price control provisions were voluntary, the
216federal regulation did not constitute an unconstitutional taking of property.
Several courts have expanded on the notion that an act is voluntary even
when there is significant economic pressure on a party to submit to the property
211deprivation.. In Gerelick v. Sullivan, a group of New York anesthesiologists
claimed that the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 ("OBRA-89") was
an unconstitutional regulatory taking. 218 OBRA-89 deals with the Part B Medi-
care Program that provides Medicare beneficiaries with supplemental bene-
fits. 219 Originally, the program was entirely voluntary. 220 A physician could
charge the patient any amount for his services, of which the patient could then
receive the Medicare "allowed charge" as partial reimbursement from Medi-
care. 22  In trying to reduce the practice of physicians charging in excess of
Medicare's "allowed charge," Congress enacted OBRA-89 which limited the
physicians' charges to a set percentage of the Medicare-defined allowed charge
22223for services.. The limit was set at 115% of the allowed charge.223 The anes-
thesiologists claimed that this "limiting charge" formula was a regulatory taking
of property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment.22 4
Citing Bowles, the Second Circuit noted that "[a] property owner must
be legally compelled to engage in price-regulated activity for regulations to give
rise to a taking., 225 The court reasoned that OBRA-89 does not require anes-
thesiologists to provide services to Medicare beneficiaries. 26 The physicians
may choose to provide medical services to non-Medicare patients only.
221
However, because hospital physicians are required, according to the Patients'
Bill of Rights, to provide services to Medicare beneficiaries, this regulation
would limit the physicians to treating patients on an outpatient-only basis.228
According to the anesthesiologists, that limit would not be "an economically
viable option, since most procedures requiring their services are performed in
215 Id. at 518.
216 Id. at 518-19.
217 See, e.g.. Garelick v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 913, 917 (2d Cir. 1993).
218 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, 42 U.S.C. § 1395u (2006); Garelick, 987 F.
2d at 914.
219 Garelick, 987 F.2d at 914.
220 Id.
221 Id. at 915.
222 Id.
223 Id.
224 Id.
225 Garelick, 987 F.2d at 916.
226 Id. at 917.
227 Id.
228 Id.
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hospitals., 229 Despite the harsh economic limit this Act poses on physicians, the
court held that "as the law presently stands, economic hardship is not equivalent
to legal compulsion for purposes of takings analysis.,, 230 Thus, because OBRA-
89 merely creates an incentive to accept the price regulation, adherence with the
Act remains voluntary and not an unconstitutional taking. Simply put, "[i]t is
well established that government ... regulation does not constitute a taking of
property where the regulated group is not required to participate in the regulated
industry.,
23 2
The government has an additional argument to bolster its position that
the proposed act does not create an unconstitutional taking of property. Because
government contracting is a "heavily regulated field," any leaseholder in the
outer continental shelf ("OCS") could not claim to be surprised that Congress
233would want to impose price thresholds on OCS leases. This is especially true
given the current prices of oil and gas. Whether an industry is heavily-regulated
plays a role in a takings analysis in that it can put an industry on notice that the
government might intervene with subsequent regulation. 34 For example, in In
re Blue Diamond Coal Co., the court reasoned that, because "[t]he federal gov-
ernment pervasively regulates the coal mining industry," it would be unreasona-
ble for a coal company "to believe that Congress would never intervene" with
subsequent regulation.2 35 Therefore, because the oil and gas industry is heavily
regulated by the federal government, the oil and gas companies holding
DWRRA leases could not be surprised by subsequent regulation reacting to sky-
rocketing prices of oil and gas worldwide.
The previously proposed Royalty Relief for American Consumers Act
will undoubtedly face litigation and be challenged as an unconstitutional taking
236if it is passed by the 1 11th Congress . However, because the Act merely
creates an incentive for oil and gas companies to renegotiate their leases, though
admittedly a harsh one, the Act does not constitute an unconstitutional taking of
property without just compensation. The ability to engage in future OCS leas-
ing with the federal government is more akin to a privilege than a right. There-
fore, revoking that privilege as an incentive to induce negotiation does not con-
229 Id.
230 Id. (citing Minnesota Ass'n of Health Care Facilities v. Minnesota Dep't of Pub. Welfare,
742 F.2d 442. 446 (8th Cir. 1984)).
231 Garelick, 987 F.2d at 917-18.
232 Id. at 917 (citing Whitney v. Heckler. 780 F.2d 963, 972 (1 1th Cir. 1944)).
233 MELTZ & VANN, supra note 185, at 6.
234 In re Blue Diamond Coal Co., 79 F.3d 516, 525 (6th Cir. 1996).
235 Id.
236 See Letter from John B. Breaux, supra note 181 ("Enactment of legislation directly or indi-
rectly imposing price thresholds now on 1998-1999 deep water OCS leases would unfairly con-
fiscate an important property interest of leaseholders and violate their contractual rights ....
Given the court's decision for summary judgment in the Kerr-McGee litigation. Congress should
know a lawsuit is likely.").
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stitute a taking. Even though this revocation leads to serious economic hardship
for oil and gas companies, they are not "legally compelled" to accept the incen-
tive and participate in future OCS leasing. A court would not even have to take
the next step and apply the three-step Penn Central analysis. The proposed Act,
therefore, does not constitute an unconstitutional taking of property.
VIII. CONCLUSION
While the DWRRA's five-year royalty "holiday" was an effective sti-
mulus in encouraging immediate exploration in the deep waters of the Gulf of
Mexico upon enactment, the recent unexpected increase in oil and gas prices has
transformed what was an attractive incentive into an unjust giveaway. Despite
what were valid contracts made in accordance with a legal statute,237 the gov-
ernment does have the power, through congressional lawmaking, to recoup
some of its lost revenue. In light of the unpredictable rise in oil and gas prices,
and the fact that the revenue from price-threshold-less oil and gas leases will
enter the pockets of the most financially successful industry in the nation, the
111 th Congress will undoubtedly have tremendous public support in its efforts
to recoup billions of dollars in foregone revenue.
Additionally, the overall purpose of the DWRRA was to encourage
companies to explore and produce in offshore lands that which they would not
otherwise be able to afford to enter.23 With oil and gas prices at their current
levels, and with new technological advancements, these oil and gas companies
no longer need royalty relief as an incentive to drill. In fact, Michael Coney, a
lawyer for Shell Oil has stated on record that "[u]nder the current environment,
we don't need royalty relief. ' 239 Even President Bush has stated that "[w]ith oil
at $50 a barrel, I don't think energy companies need taxpayer-funded incentives
to explore. 240  President Obama has also expressed concern over unjustified
subsidies and royalty relief programs, calling on Congress to combat "excessive
royalty relief.', 241 Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court's recent denial of the
Department of Interior's petition for writ of certiorari in Kerr-McGee may also
refocus a busy Congress on the issue. The only obstacle standing in the way of
congressional action, then, would be the nearly certain impending legal action
brought by the oil and gas companies when the legislation is enacted.
As discussed in Part VII, it is unlikely that an oil and gas company
would be successful in a regulatory taking action against the government if the
237 See supra Part V.A B (discussing the Fifth Circuit's holding in Kerr-McGee).
238 See supra Part I1I.A B.
239 Vague Law, supra note 17.
240 Id. Even though President Bush placed a top priority on expanding oil and gas production.
and urged the government to explore opportunities for royalty reduction and to open areas like the
Arctic National Wildlife Refuge in Alaska to drilling, he showed some skepticism about giving
new incentives to drillers. Id.
241 See Dlouhy. supra note 174.
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242Royalty Relief for American Consumers Act were passed as currently written.
Because the RRACA creates a voluntary incentive - though admittedly a very
harsh one - any change in a contract term by an oil and gas lessee would be
voluntary. Because a successful taking action requires legal compulsion, rather
than mere inducement, the oil and gas companies' takings argument must fail.
The American people have already lost over $5 billion in foregone rev-
enue because of a lack of enforceable price thresholds in DWRRA leases. This
total, because of the ruling in Kerr-McGee, will rise to an estimated $53 billion
over the life of the leases.243 This giveaway no longer represents an "incentive
to explore," as was originally intended. It simply amounts to a gift that keeps on
giving. In light of stabilized oil prices well over $50 per barrel, the Royalty
Relief for American Consumers Act, or its equivalent, must be passed by the
1 1 th Congress. The American people, in the midst of "the worst financial cri-
sis since the Great Depression, '244 can no longer afford to subsidize oil and gas
companies already swimming in record profits.
J. Todd Bergstrom
242 See supra Part VII.
243 See supra Part V.D.
244 President Obama repeatedly used this language on the campaign trail and during his early
months in office to characterize the United States' current financial situation. See Steve Holland,
Obana: U.S. in Worst Crisis Since Depression, REUTERS, Oct. 7, 2008,
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN0749084220081008.
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